Catholic Principles of Slavery in the Teaching of Theologians of the 16th and 17th Centuries

1.1. Slavery in Islamic science and law

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, slavery was an institution established in all Muslim countries. Islam accepted slavery, although according to Islamic law, or Sharia, the basic state of man is freedom. One early Muslim scholar, Ibn al-Mundhir (d. 930), believed that God the Most High created Adam and kept him from being possessed by anyone, and did the same with Eve; and all men come from these two. Therefore, all children of Adam are free, and the only people who can be enslaved are those non-Muslims whom the Muslims have captured.⁸

So who was the slave? According to Sharia, a slave was someone’s property. Slaves could therefore be bought, sold, rented or loaned, as well as inherited. Slavery in Islamic legal works was treated as a legal handicap, weakness, or deficiency that lowered a person’s standard in specific areas, such as the ability to own property or to appear in court as a witness. In books of Islamic law, chapters on the treatment of slaves were often followed by sections on the treatment of animals. In some cases, slavery laws provided the basis for analogies in the treatment of farm animals. For example, it was forbidden to burden an animal beyond its strength, as this was analogous to the command not to overburden a slave.

A free man who was not a Muslim could be made a slave. The law prohibited Muslims from enslaving each other, although if someone was already a slave and converted to Islam, he remained a slave; accepting Islam did not automatically make him a free man. Slaves were basically non-Muslims captured during war or military expeditions. Jihad allowed them to be taken captive and made into slaves. After the period of intense Arab conquests in the seventh and eighth centuries, however, there were still military expeditions and simple pirate raids, the main goal of which was to capture non-Muslims in order to make them slaves.⁹ Such expeditions took place to Sub-Saharan Africa, from where black slaves were imported,¹⁰ and also against Christians in Europe. Particularly aggressive were frequent attacks by Muslim pirates and corsairs not only throughout the Mediterranean basin, but also on the Atlantic coasts of Europe, where they reached as far as the coast of England, the English Channel and the Thames estuary.¹¹

Slaves could also be purchased outside the area of Islam, and this was the second most common form of acquiring slaves. After all, you could be born a slave if both your parents were also slaves.

Muslim jurists reserved primacy for the state in the matter of the slave system (riqq). This is best seen in the example of slave ownership and trade: riqq was created and maintained by the Muslim state, theoretically through conquest and the capture of enemies. The state then distributed and permitted the use and exchange of slaves. This can already be seen in the early period of conquest, when the rule was introduced that sex with a woman taken captive was prohibited until the spoils of war were divided. During the Caliphate of Umar, a warrior who had sexual intercourse with a captured woman before dividing the spoils was found guilty of rape.

According to scholars from the Hanafi school,¹² the servile status of a slave belonged to God’s law and therefore to the Muslim state as the exponent of this law. The owner of a slave had only the property rights attached to the slave. This was a derivative of the enslavement of this person by the state, which was called “God’s law.” Riqq was God’s law because only God could take away man’s innate freedom, and a free person could not make himself a slave. Riqq was also the law of the state, since enslavement was the result of the ruler’s conquest and capture, and then the division of the spoils of war. As a result, when a Muslim purchased a slave, for example, at the Cairo slave market, he was not purchasing the slave status itself. He was buying the property rights (māliyya) of a slave.¹³

Related to the status of the slave as owned by God’s law and, consequently, by the state, was the problem of the legality of those slaves for whom the tax of the fifth part on all acquisitions (khums) had not been paid. The Quran commanded:

And know that whatever you take as spoils in war, a fifth thereof shall go to Allah and to the Messenger and to the kindred and orphans and the needy and the wayfarer, if you believe in Allah and in what We sent down to Our servant on the Day of Distinction-the day when the two armies met-and Allah has the power to do all things. (Quran VIII, 42)

On this basis, Abu Muhammad Juwayni (d. 1047) believed that it was best to avoid purchasing slave girls who had been kidnapped during raids into non-Muslim territory, because proper procedures for accepting and distributing spoils were regularly disregarded. Referring to this opinion, the later lawyer Taqi al-Din Subki (d. 1355) recommended avoiding buying female slaves who could be seized or stolen by the invaders. It was not certain whether the khums tax had been paid on them, and the law of the Shafi’i school was so strict that all property taken from non-Muslims outside the boundaries of Islam required the payment of the khums tax. This problem had very practical consequences: Sharia allowed the owner of female slaves to have sex with them. Therefore, if it turned out that one of them was not actually a slave because no khums had been paid for her, then intercourse with her would not be allowed.

How did Sharia describe the relationship between a slave and his master? Regarding religious practices, the master could not force a non-Muslim slave to convert to Islam, nor could he forbid a dhimmi¹⁴ slave from performing religious duties or drinking wine. However, a slave who was a Muslim had the right to perform obligatory prayers, but was not obliged to participate in Friday congregational prayer, pay zakat¹⁵ or perform hajj.¹⁶

Regarding marital and family life, the Hanbali, Shafi’i and often Hanafi schools did not allow a master to force a slave to marry or divorce against his will. The master could not forbid a married slave from staying with her husband at night, and a married slave was physically inaccessible to her owner. He also couldn’t see her nakedness then. Mothers who had child slaves could not be separated from them, and the Hanbali school believed that separating any family members to the level of uncles/aunts was forbidden, and the Hanafis believed that it was strongly discouraged. A master could have any number of female slaves with whom he could have sexual relations. This law was probably the most significant feature of Sharia, however, written in Quran,¹⁷ it was assumed that consent to sex was not necessary in the case of a slave. A child born to a free man and his slave concubine was free, legitimate, and had the same social status as children born to a free wife. The owner could also marry his slave, for example, to another slave, without asking her consent. In turn, male slaves who wanted to marry had to obtain the consent of their masters.

Numerous hadiths¹⁸ advised masters to treat their slaves kindly, not to overload them with excessive work, to provide them with adequate food and clothing, and to readily forgive transgressions. The slave was to be subjected to a normal workload based on the customary understanding of workload in a given society. Clothes had to be adapted to the weather and could not be limited to merely covering the slave’s nakedness. However, a distinction was made between requirements and recommendations. For example, the hadith that clothes and food were due to slaves according to their custom was considered a requirement. However, the hadith that urged owners to feed and clothe slaves with their own food and clothes was only recommendation.¹⁹

Hadith forbade physical mutilation or castration of slaves. Any severe punishment or treatment that left permanent scars was grounds for forced disinheritance, and during the Ottoman period, slaves continually went to court for this reason. A master could punish his slave verbally or physically, but most scholars took the view that this could not go beyond what a husband/father could do to his wife or child. It was forbidden to kill a slave. If the killing was accidental or, in the case of murder, if the victim’s family chose not to execute the murderer (however, only the Hanafi school maintained that the murder of a slave could result in the execution of a free person), the Sharia ordered compensation to be paid to the family. All schools of law agreed that the compensation (diya) for killing a slave was not equal to the amount that the Prophet had fixed for men or women, but rather the market value of the slave. The main position of the Hanafi school, however, did not allow this amount to exceed the value of the life of a free person. However, according to the Shafi’i school, one had to pay the value of the slave, regardless of whether it exceeded the diya of the free person. In the event of non-fatal injuries to slaves, according to almost all schools of law, the compensation payable was simply the fraction established for such injuries in the case of a free person, multiplied by the value of the slave.²⁰

However, the peculiarity of Sharia remains the treatment of slaves in the event of crimes committed by them. Typically, the punishment given to slaves was half of that suffered by free people. The basis for this was the Quranic command that slave women who committed sexual crimes should receive half the punishment given to free women. This order was also extended to certain privileges. In all Sunni schools of law except the Maliki school, slaves could marry only two wives—half the limit of four that the Quran set for free men. The waiting period for remarriage for the wives of slaves whose husbands had died or were divorced was half that set for free women by the Quran. In the Hanafi and Shafi’i schools, if a man married both a free woman and a slave woman, the free wife was entitled to twice as much time and attention as the slave wife. Only the Maliki school did not take into account the extension of the analogy of half to matters of marriage and family, considering the original provision of the Quran on punishing slave women with half the punishment as completely unrelated to other areas of law.²¹

Slaves are forbidden to escape. Many hadiths warn slaves against running away from their masters or mention a special reward awaiting them for good service. One of the hadiths of Al-Bukhari (d. 870) says that there are two people who will receive a double reward from God on the Day of Judgment. The first is the slave who has fulfilled his obligations to both God and his master. The second is a master who took his slave girl as a concubine, raised her well, and then set her free and took her as his wife.

However, what was perhaps most characteristic of Islam was the persistent appeal in countless hadiths encouraging the freeing of slaves.²² The hadith promised rewards in the form of salvation in the afterlife to those who free their slaves. Such an act is regarded as a good deed done for God’s sake or as a required atonement for sins or crimes (Quran XC, 12–16). Thus, a Muslim who accidentally kills another person should free the Muslim slave and pay compensation to the victim’s family (Quran IV, 93). A Muslim who breaks his oath should free a slave or, if he is unable to do so, feed ten needy people, or, if he is unable to do so, he is to fast for three days (Quran V, 90). A Muslim who returns to his wife after taking an oath of renunciation (ẓihār)²³ must free the slave girl or, if he is unable, he should feed 60 needy people, and if he is unable to do so, he must fast for two months (Quran LVIII, 4–5). The Prophet extended this path of penance to a Muslim who had sexual intercourse with his spouse during the Ramadan fast (or, according to the Hanfai and Malikit schools of law, to a Muslim who intentionally broke the fast in any way).²⁴

In order to obtain emancipation, a slave could enter into a contract with his master under which he obtained his freedom (mukataba) after paying an agreed price. These types of agreements are recommended in the Quran (II, 178; IX, 60). For this reason, a slave is considered to have had at least a limited right of ownership. This restriction consisted, for example, in the fact that when the master sold a slave, he kept his property. Ultimately, the slave property belonged to the master.

1.2. European scholars and philosophers about slavery

Moving now to the Christian cultural circle, we will first briefly discuss what the most outstanding thinkers and philosophers of that time wrote about slavery in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I will briefly present the views on slavery of four famous thinkers; these are, in chronological order: Jean Bodin (1530–1596), Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704). At the same time, the little-known principle of “free land,” applicable in early modern times in France and the Netherlands, will be described.

Jean Bodin was a French lawyer and founder of political thought. His most famous work is Les Six Livres de la République, published in 1576, in which Bodin described various forms of state systems and presented his concept of sovereignty. In the same work, Bodin considers the question of whether there should be slaves in a well-ordered state.

Referring to the Aristotelian concept of slavery by nature, Bodin, although he is aware of the fact that slavery has occurred in human history since ancient times, criticizes the view that it is in accordance with nature.²⁵ He distinguishes ways of becoming a slave: by being born to a slave, by virtue of the law of war—enslavement of captured prisoners, slavery as a punishment for committing a crime, surrendering or self-selling into slavery. He also mentions the historic form of debt slavery.

Bodin believes that the historical source of slavery has always been low motives. History proves not only that slavery is wrong, but also that it is not useful. Any argument proving that slavery reduces the scourge of vagrancy and thievery, Bodin regards as false. Rather, it should be prevented by appropriate social policies. Bodin also claims that nothing debases and corrupts a good and noble heart more than slavery, and nothing lessens the dignity of giving orders to others than being a slave yourself. By invoking the authority of the Gospels, Bodin confirms the view expressed there that there is nothing worse than a slave who has become a master. Therefore, he postulates that the slaves should not be freed immediately, but should first be taught an appropriate craft so that they can cope in freedom.²⁶

Bodin also considers the abolition of slavery in France to be a great achievement. In doing so, he refers to the well-known principle of French law, followed by French lawyers and judges since the fifteenth century, stating that “no one is a slave in France” (nul n’est esclave en France), thus extending freedom to the many slaves who set foot on French soil. The earliest this principle was adhered to in Toulouse, where, as early as the fourteenth century, serfs and slaves fled there seeking freedom. In 1444 Paris Parliament confirmed French adherence to the principle of free soil in Toulouse.²⁷

Regarding the whole of France, this custom received royal sanction later on. When in 1691 two Black Africans hiding on a ship from Martinique reached France, King Louis XIV (reigned 1643–1715) was informed of this event and ordered their immediate release: because the slaves had reached France, they were therefore free. Their owner was reimbursed, deducted from the salary of the captain of the ship, who had been careless enough to allow them to sneak aboard.²⁸ The paradox was that the French, not tolerating slavery in their own country, allowed and accepted it in their overseas colonies, and the mutual relations of masters and slaves were even codified in a royal ordinance called Code noir, issued in 1685.

The principle of “free soil,” on which, having set foot, a slave became free, was also prevalent in the Netherlands in a slightly different way. The municipal laws of Antwerp and Amsterdam affirmed the principle of freedom for all inhabitants of those cities and their surroundings. In the case of slaves, on the other hand, who came to these cities, the laws provided that if their owners tried to keep them as slaves or ordered them to serve against their will, then the slaves could bring their masters before the court and there declare themselves free.²⁹ This principle was extended to the whole country, as was confirmed by the case of the escape in 1532 of Simon, a slave of the Portuguese ambassador in Antwerp. After the escape of his slave, the ambassador demanded his capture, but the Grand Council of Malines replied that slavery was not recognized by the internal law of the seventeenth Province, and that the authorities of the Habsburg Netherlands should not give assistance to a slave owner who had lost him in these countries and was trying to recover him.³⁰

However, these libertarian tendencies did not have much influence on Hugo Grotius (Huig De Groot), the Dutch philosopher, writer and jurist considered to be the founder of the science of international law. His most important work, De jure belli ac pacis, published in 1625, was devoted to the topic of international law. In this work, Grotius also set out his views on slavery. According to him, slavery consists of the obligation of constant labor in exchange for food and the satisfaction of other necessary needs. There is therefore no undue hardship in it. Masters have no right of life and death over slaves, although in some nations masters are not punished if they kill their slave for any reason.³¹ Grotius also accepts the view of Aristotle, who taught that some people are by nature slaves, although he did not elaborate on this.³²

Grotius devotes slightly more space to considering the slavery of children sold into slavery by their parents in extreme need. He considers that the right of masters to own such children derives from the owner’s provision of food and other necessities of life. Grotius also believes that children inherit their mother’s slave state, although by the law of nature they should follow both the mother and the father, since they both equally care for the offspring.³³

By far the most this thinker has to say about slaves captured in war. All captives are escorted into captivity and it is not required that they be guilty of any crime. The fate of all is the same. They could be killed, but it is more advantageous for the chiefs to make them slaves.³⁴ Pointing to numerous historical examples of taken captives being killed in war, Grotius believes that the conversion of a death sentence to life imprisonment is undoubtedly a considerable relaxation of custom in these circumstance.³⁵ However, if the owner treats the slave very harshly, he has the right to escape, even if he himself has enslaved himself.³⁶ Under Roman law, slaves redeemed from the enemy became the property of the redeemer, and the former owner could reclaim them on the return of the sum paid.³⁷

Grotius’ views on slavery (especially as a consequence of capture in war) found their continuators in other seventeenth-century jurists: Richard Zouche (1590–1661), Samuel Rachel (1628–1691) and Johann Wolfgang Textor (1638–1701).

Let us now move to England, where Thomas Hobbes, regarded as the founder of the theory of contractualism, was writing. He presented his concept of the social contract in his work Leviathan, published in 1651. This English scholar was so taken with the idea of contractualism he had invented that he also tried to apply it to slavery. He believed that the slavery of prisoners of war was the result of an agreement between them and the winner, under which those captured became his slaves in exchange for sparing their lives. Once such a deal was made, the captive became a servant (slave). Thus, it was not the victory that gave the right to power over the defeated, but the contract concluded.³⁸

According to Hobbes, the master of a slave owns everything that the slave owns. It is therefore up to the master to use the slave, his labor, as well as his servants and his children, whenever he sees fit. Such a servant is dependent in everything on his master, who could kill him or put him in chains for showing disobedience. The slave himself would be the perpetrator of this, since he has contractually undertaken to obey his master.³⁹

Hobbes’ ideas are linked to those of another Englishman, John Locke. In his best-known work Two Treatises of Government, published in 1689, Locke contrasts despotic government with the power derived from the conclusion of a social contract by individuals, who delegate their power to a ruler thus elected, giving up part of their liberty. For in the state of nature, individuals possessed the natural rights to life, liberty and property, but the absence of a properly constituted authority made the exercise of these rights uncertain, hence the necessity of a social contract arose.⁴⁰

According to Locke, the right to life possessed by every man may be lost by him if he takes part in an unjust war and is defeated. Then his life is in the hands of the victor, who has despotic power over him. The victor thus disposes of the life, as well as the servantude and goods of the defeated one (goods only so that he can repair the damage done to himself by the defeated one), who thus becomes a slave. However, this applies only to those who took part in, collaborated in, supported or condoned an unjust war. Only they can become slaves.⁴¹

According to Locke, a state of bondage is nothing but a prolonged state of war between the rightful conqueror and the captive. When, therefore, a settlement is reached between them for the purpose of limiting the power of one party and securing the obedience of the other, the state of war and captivity ceases for the duration of the agreement.⁴² Locke is thus of the exact opposite opinion to Hobbes, who believed that it was the conclusion of a contract between the victor and the vanquished that made the latter a slave.

Locke further believes that the mentally ill, the insane and generally those who do not use reason should also be deprived of their liberty. Such people should be educated and guided by others. Locke’s view seems to be derived in this aspect from Aristotle’s views on so-called slavery by nature.⁴³

Although Locke’s views appear to have been essentially opposed to slavery, his theoretical admission of the slavery of prisoners captured in war corresponded with practice: Locke, as secretary to Lord Ashley, transcribed the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in 1669, which ensured that church membership would have no bearing on the status of slaves and that every free man of Carolina would have absolute power and authority over his Black African slaves. Locke also became an investor in the Royal African Company, which was involved in, among other things, the slave trade, and clearly believed that Black African slavery was a legitimate institution.⁴⁴

Summarizing the views of four European early modern thinkers, it should be noted that only one of them, Jean Bodin, challenged slavery in principle. The others accepted at least some of the ways in which a free man could be made a slave (most often involving prisoners of war) and did not oppose slavery as such. This should not be surprising, since there was no protest against slavery from philosophers and writers such as Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Pascal, Bayle or Fontenelle.⁴⁵

1.3. Protestant preachers toward slavery

Now that we know that the great thinkers and writers of early modern Europe did not oppose slavery, let’s take a look at what preachers of Protestant denominations and sects that began to emerge in many European countries after Luther’s rebellion in 1517 had to say about it.

Protestant thinkers tended to be cautious in their reflections on the legitimacy of original enslavement. They imagined human bondage not so much as a just punishment, but as a model of human dependence on a higher power. It was a picture of an obedient servant in a Christian family, part of a stable Christian household governed by the Bible and righteous reason. These Protestant thinkers admonished all slaves to respect their masters and to be patient, obedient and industrious. For if a servant were allowed to question his fate, it would undermine the foundations of the social order.

According to these Protestant writers, neither the power of the master should be absolute nor the subordination of the slave completely absolute. William Perkins (1558–1602), who was an influential Cambridge Anglican clergyman and theologian, and one of the prominent leaders of the Puritan movement during the Elizabethan period, believed that in this life Christian liberty extended only to the spirit, and that the institution of slavery, established by positive law, could exist without remorse if used in moderation. Therefore, no master had the right to separate families, to command what God forbade, or even to bind servants to perpetual slavery and never release them. For this reason, Perkins argued, Aristotle was wrong to think of slavery resulting from nature.

William Ames (1576–1633), English Puritan pastor, philosopher and polemicist, took a similar view. He doubted whether a master could hold an innocent servant in absolute bondage without violating the Golden Rule. But even he acknowledged that a crime deserving death could rightly be punished by perpetual slavery. Ames, however, like Perkins, was opposed to the master’s absolute power over the slave because he feared that total enslavement would corrupt the master and that the slave would only accept it out of necessity.⁴⁶

This quest to find the “golden mean” of slavery also had its extreme interpretations from both sides. Thus, William Gouge (1575–1653), an English Puritan clergyman and writer, attacking the position proclaiming that all men were equal and that bonds of servitude were contrary to nature, believed that a servant must consent even to an unjust beating by his master, knowing that he would ultimately be avenged by divine justice. On the other hand, Robert Sanderson (1587–1663), an Anglican theologian and casuist, maintained that one must not acknowledge anyone as supreme master or submit completely and absolutely to the will of anyone on earth, but obey Christ alone, who is supreme Lord in heaven and on earth.

The theological limitation of the master’s power over the slave found its justification in the work of Samuel Willard (1640–1707), an American Puritan clergyman who was pastor of Third Church in Boston from 1678 until his death, and served as president of Harvard University from 1701. Criticizing the Aristotelian theory of slavery by nature, Willard argued that pagan philosophers were ignorant of man’s primitive state of perfection and mistakenly identified the law of nature with what they observed in the sinful world. According to Willard, all slavery arose as a result of the universal corruption of man, whereas all men owed their original allegiance to God. Therefore, no master could claim absolute dominion over a slave, and no servant could lose all his freedom. If so, in view of this, the master must recognize that his slave’s soul is worth as much as his own and refrain from cruel punishments, abusive and unjustified threats or from giving his servants derisive names, as if they were inferior creatures. Willard explained that although slavery was brought into the world by sin, right reason indicates that the institution is a proper part of the world order of power, and is useful and proper for humanity. It is Providence that has made a distinction in the dignity of birth which man is bound to observe.⁴⁷

By contrast, views similar to the Aristotelian theory of slavery by nature seem to be represented by Gabriel Towerson (ca. 1635–1697), an English clergyman and theological writer. In 1676, he wrote and published Explication of the Decalogue in London. In this work Towerson noted that there are many poor people, similar to some animals, who are unable to govern themselves. He argued that some people were by nature incapable of supporting themselves. Slavery will therefore provide for their sustenance and will deter them from extreme acts to which they may be driven by ignorance or nature. Towerson held masters responsible for providing slaves with adequate food and clothing, and to the latter he had to say that their work is done for God, who has assigned them their lowly position. Therefore he did not like the gradual abolition of slavery in Europe, because it was not based on any legitimate purpose nor did it provide much comfort to the world.⁴⁸

When the establishment of British colonies in the North American territories began in the seventeenth century, the issue of conversion and baptism of the growing number of black slaves emerged in sharp focus. Slave owners were opposed to both baptizing slaves and bringing them into local Protestant communities, lest this upset the established social hierarchy.⁴⁹ Slavery legislation in the British colonies was racist and punitive from the outset. It divided society into two categories: on the one hand, white proprietors and planters; on the other, Black Africans and “Indians,” both slaves and free. Every citizen was obliged to keep Black African slaves and free Black Africans in line. And this duty applied not only to his own slaves, but to all. In English America, a slave belonged in a sense to every citizen—at least he was subordinate to every white citizen. Thus, a plantation slave could be stopped by any white man and questioned about his actions. Citizens were statutorily organized into patrols to capture runaways. Penalties were set for each escape: if the master did not carry them out within a certain time, the white planters community did. The authorities declared that slaves could only wear appropriate clothing, and could even determine what attire would be appropriate. The colonial authorities intervened in the education of slaves even to the point of forbidding teaching them to read and write. Slaves were not allowed to buy and sell unless their master wanted them to. They could not live away from their master; they could not keep horses, cattle or pigs; they could not rent out their time even if their master allowed it. These rules did not apply at all times and in all colonies or states, but they gave a general trend to the law.⁵⁰

With all this said, the criminal laws of the English colonies were ruthless toward slaves. For example, The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina of 1669 provided that if any Black African (free or slave) or “Indian” slave struck a white man, he should be severely whipped. If such an offense was repeated, in addition to whipping, his nose should be cut off and his face branded. On the third time, he was to be left to two magistrates and three free owners to inflict death on him or inflict another punishment at their discretion. Slaves were not allowed to move away from the plantation without the master issuing an appropriate document, which was to give the details of the slave and his master, from where and to where he was traveling and the time allotted. Slaves caught while escaping were severely whipped, and repeat offenders had the letter R (runaway) burned on their cheek. Subsequent unsuccessful escape attempts resulted in the cutting off of ears, castration and finally cutting the ligament of one of the slave’s legs or sentencing him to death.⁵¹

In this kind of community, with such strong attitudes against each other between its white and black members, it should not be surprising that any proposals to convert slaves to Christianity formulated by Protestant preachers aroused resistance and opposition from slaveo-wners. However, in the seventeenth century, the activities of Protestant clergymen regarding the slave issue amounted to convincing slave owners of the need to baptize them. Richard Baxter (1615–1691), an English Puritan church leader, poet, theologian and polemicist, believed that faith was about the soul, not the outward state, and that servants should therefore honor the Providence of God that called them into the life of servants and not grumble because of their work or low condition, but know their graces and be grateful for them. The masters, on the other hand, were to maintain their authority as trustees of Christ and were obliged to guide the Black African slaves toward Christian living, otherwise they risked being convicted of open rebellion against God. At the same time, Baxter applauded rulers who enacted laws making baptism equivalent to liberation, as this could lead infidels to seek Christianity. In addition, although Baxter accepted slavery as a consequence of war, crime or poverty, he was aware of the wicked ways in which slaves were obtained in Africa and called their captors the common enemies of mankind. Baxter believed that buying such slaves was a disgraceful sin, unless it was done for the purpose of freeing them. Colonial planters who reduced their Black Africans to the level of animals were, for him, devils incarnate. Equating English slave owners to Spanish conquistadors and interpreting the plagues and hurricanes in the West Indies as God’s deserved punishment meant that Baxter had little sympathy for white slave owners.⁵²

Even more forceful in his views was the English clergyman Morgan Godwyn (ca. 1640–ca. 1686), who caused controversy in Virginia by preaching that planters should promote the spiritual welfare of their slaves by converting them to Christianity. He had to flee to Barbados, where he encountered similar resistance. There he began to write; in 1680 he published his most important work The Negro’s and Indian’s Advocate. Suing for Their Admission Into the Church. Seeking to encourage masters to convert slaves to Christianity and to assuage their fears, Godwyn wrote that there was complete compatibility between slavery and Christianity. Christianity establishes the authority of masters over their servants and slaves to such a high degree that even they themselves could not command it by demanding the strictest fidelity, serving with a pure heart as for God and not for men. Besides, the acceptance of faith so far does not encourage resistance that it does not allow slaves the freedom to evade or give false answers to their masters. And it refers them to a future reward in heaven for their faithful service rendered to their masters on earth.

Christianity, apart from making slaves better workers, was the best safeguard against disloyalty and rebellion. Nor was there any reason to believe that baptism entailed liberation. Neither Abrahamic slaves were freed by circumcision, nor was Onesimus freed by baptism unless he was free in the sense of serving Christ, which was the most perfect freedom of all. The colonists therefore had no justification for keeping their slaves from professing the Christian religion. If there were any laws, originally enacted to make Christianity more attractive, which could be interpreted as harmful to slavery, this danger could easily have been removed by the legislature. And if the colonists were unsure of the validity of their own laws, they could appeal to the king and parliament. In any case, American masters could only enjoy a clear conscience if they knew that they had not condemned their Black Africans to eternal slavery in hell by denying them the opportunity to be baptized.