Bread and Bombers

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many people who made this book a reality. Stony Brook University provided a positive, supportive environment in which to work, especially in the History Department. First and foremost, I express my deepest appreciation to Michael Barnhart for his wisdom and guidance during this long process. His constant reminders to remain focused on the base negotiations were combined with a wide berth in terms of pursuing different categories of analysis. Without his input, this project would not have started, let alone been finished. I would also like to thank him for his rapid turnaround during the draft process in the past year. All of his edits, large and small, proved invaluable for evidence, clarity of argument and all-around quality of this work.

I am tremendously grateful for the generous support provided by the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) and the History of Science Society (HSS) for honoring me with their 2016–2017 Research Fellowship. The total freedom that they offered made my time in the National Archives and Library of Congress in Washington, DC, incredibly productive. While at the Archives in College Park, MD, David Langbart and the rest of the staff at NARA provided excellent guidance and help in finding the relevant documents that I needed. Their dedication and rapid response convinced me that our archives are a national treasure.

Two special friends also merit mention. Craig Markson, who introduced me to Michael Barnhart and helped me secure a campus job from 2012 to 2016. Craig was the best manager I ever had; his never-ending sense of humor made the most difficult times of the programme bearable, and the victories even better. Lastly, I would like to thank Major Rick McLaughlin, United States Marine Corps, who gave his life for his country in 2015. My only regret is that I could not share this with you, my friend.

During the Cold War, a key part of the strategy of containment of the Soviet Union was to construct a ring of military bases around the world from Iceland in the North Atlantic to England and Gibraltar, to North Africa, and all around the subsequent regions up to Japan. Around the world, the United States engaged in a series of negotiations to make this “necklace of bases” around the Soviet Union a reality. Legacies from Operation Torch in 1942 against Nazi Germany, these bases had several new roles starting from their conversion and expansion in 1950. In the Cold War, these bases served the United States Air Force – USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC).

In this strategy of constructing this vast chain, guarding the approaches to the Mediterranean Sea emerged as a key objective in the event of a conventional attack on Western Europe by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Morocco, situated on the southern side of the Straits of Gibraltar, fits the role geographically. From Morocco, the United States could send in reinforcements and supplies from the American mainland, transfer combat and support aircraft, and assist with sea surveillance and anti-submarine patrols in the central and north Atlantic. This study focuses on the diplomatic negotiations for these bases – first with France in 1950 and then with the newly independent nation of Morocco from 1956 to 1959. Finally, as the decade of the 1960s loomed, the United States was able to negotiate an exit from Morocco by 1964 while still maintaining a military relationship. Relatively smooth negotiations with France under the Bidault–Caffery Accord took place rapidly in the panic of the late 1950s Chinese offensives during the Korean War. By contrast, the process to maintain the bases after the expulsion of France from Morocco took well over three years, requiring a combination of bilateral negotiations – with Morocco refusing to allow France a seat at the table – and massive quantities of food aid.