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In the Shadows of Cold War Politics

Polish–Belgian Relations, 1945–1980

by Dariusz Jarosz (Author) Maria Pasztor (Author)
©2026 Monographs XII, 380 Pages

Summary

This monograph aspires to be no more than a preliminary analytical survey of Polish–Belgian relations in the years 1945–1980 in their political, cultural-educational, economic and commercial aspects. The chief aim was to identify the dynamics of these relations, establishing when and why they were most productive, and when they deteriorated and dropped to freezing point.
The authors' findings were based primarily on extensive archival research, which included documents stored in the New Records Archive (AAN), and the Foreign Ministry Archive (AMSZ) in Warsaw. Archival research in Belgium brought far poorer results, though relatively broad access to the “Polish series” in the Belgian Foreign Affairs Archives (Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères Belges) was gained.

Table Of Contents

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • List of Tables
  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction
  • 1. Research Aim and Status: Milestones, Watersheds and Sources
  • 2. The Historical Context: Polish–Belgian Relations 1918–1945
  • Part I The Cold War at Its Zenith: 1945–1952
  • Chapter 1 Political Relations
  • 1.1. The Polish Minority as a Political Problem
  • 1.1.1. Harassment, Repression and Intimidation
  • 1.2. Spymania
  • 1.2.1. The Case of Albert Snauwaert
  • 1.2.2. The Louis-François Quievreux vel Stefan Budziński Affair
  • 1.3. Discussions on the German Question and the Oder–Neisse Border
  • Chapter 2 Economic Relations
  • 2.1. The Indemnification Issue
  • 2.2. Trade Exchange
  • 2.2.1. The Years 1945–1949
  • 2.2.2. 1950–1952
  • Chapter 3 Culture and Education
  • 3.1. Atrophied Cultural Contacts
  • 3.2. Heated Disputes Over Polish Education in Belgium
  • Part II From Thaw to War (1953–1962/1963)
  • Chapter 4 Political Relations: Key Problems
  • 4.1. The Belgian Queen’s Secret Political Mission
  • 4.2. The “Hel” Affair
  • 4.3. Freedom for Belgian Spies
  • 4.4. Disputes on the Oder–Neisse Border (Continued)
  • 4.5. Towards Detente
  • 4.6. The Congo Twixt Brussels and Warsaw
  • Chapter 5 Economic Relations
  • 5.1. Trade
  • 5.2. Indemnification Agreement
  • Chapter 6 Culture, Scholarship and Education
  • 6.1. Early Symptoms of the “Thaw” (1953–1956)
  • 6.1.1. Polish Immigrant Education
  • 6.2. Culture and Scholarship: Contacts, 1957–1962/1963
  • 6.2.1. Problems in Cultural Agreements
  • 6.2.2 Effects of Cooperation in Culture and Scholarship
  • Part III Progressive Détente, 1963–1980
  • Chapter 7 Political Issues
  • 7.1. Oder–Neisse: Subject Closed
  • 7.2. Attitude to Gomułka’s Plan
  • 7.3. Discussions on Disarmament and Security
  • Chapter 8 Economic Relations
  • 8.1. Final Indemnification Disputes
  • 8.2. Economic Exchange
  • Chapter 9 Culture, Scholarship and Social Security
  • 9.1. Treaties, Agreements and Programmes
  • 9.2. Effects of Cooperation
  • 9.3. Social Security
  • Conclusion
  • 1. 1945–1952/1953
  • 2. 1953–1962/1963
  • 3. 1963–1980
  • Bibliography
  • Glossary
  • Index

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank everyone who supported – at various stages and in various ways – this research project into aspects of post-World War II Polish–Belgian relations.

The authors also thank especially the deans, Dr Daniel Przastek and the late Prof. Katarzyna Kołodziejczyk. It was their decision to provide financial support for our research in Belgian archives and for the publication of the results of this research that made this book possible.

Our words of thanks go out to Ewa Bogusławska who attended to the many administrative tasks associated with this publication, not least to contacts with its publisher.

Our thanks extend to Joanna Czapska-Ławniczak, Director of the Library of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, for her invaluable assistance with library research.

We could not hope for a better translator than Antoni Bohdanowicz who combines linguistic competence with vast knowledge of contemporary Polish history. Due to him, this monograph’s English version is better than what was delivered to him in Polish.

Finally, a word of appreciation is due to the participants in discussions on fragments of this book, especially those at the Polish Academy of Sciences’ Post-1945 Polish History Research Institute. Their comments and suggestions were invaluable in bringing numerous issues into sharper relief and in avoiding the odd factual pitfall.

Introduction

1. Research Aim and Status: Milestones, Watersheds and Sources

This monograph aspires to be no more than a preliminary analytical survey of Polish–Belgian bilateral relations in the years 1945–1980 in their political, cultural–educational, economic, commercial and, to a certain extent, pension rights. The chief aim was to identify the dynamics of these relations, establishing when and why they were most productive, and when they deteriorated and dropped to freezing point.

The urge to delve into this subject area was stimulated by the conviction that research into it to date, though by no means non-existent, is somewhat fragmentary. Pride of place among the trail-blazers here goes to Józef Łaptos and the scholars gathered around him who, relatively recently, published a volume of studies on select problems in these relations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.1 Of these, Aneta Nisiobęcka and Agnieszka Kulesa’s2 case study on the process of emigration to Belgium and repatriation to Poland, on the example of one family, deserves special mention.

The Belgian researcher who took up the challenge of studying twentieth-century Polish–Belgian relations is Idesbald Goddeeris. His focal interest was the Polish immigrant community in Belgium select aspects of inter-state relations.3 Basic information on this particular community can also be found in the works of Polish authors.4 In his sketch in Intégration ou représentation? Les exilés polonais en Belgique et la construction européenne, Goddeeris ties research into the Polish immigrant community in Belgium with the political situation in communist Poland, especially in the 1970s, in an interesting way.5 Apart from Goddeeris, bilateral Polish–Belgian affairs have been dealt with by a fairly limited number of Belgian researchers. It would be worth at least highlighting the detailed studies resulting from the academic cooperation between the Catholic universities of Belgium and Lublin,6 or the bilateral Polish–Belgian contacts in the inter-war period.

It seems that Belgian researchers have been interested not so much in the twists and turns of cooperation between Brussels and Warsaw at the international level, as in communist Europe as such, as a political bloc in which the Polish People’s Republic played a telling role. They maintained that certain Belgian politicians, such as Paul-Henri Spaak or Pierre Harmel, tried to pursue something in the nature of a Belgian version of Ostpolitik.7

One of the most heated debates on the political role of Belgium as a small country in the Cold War period burst into flames upon the publication of Vincent Dujardin’s article on this subject. Dujardin sought to prove that Belgium, at least in the years of detente in East–West relations, sought to play the role of a proactive go-between between the great powers. Dujardin maintains that in the period 1961–1973, Belgium had its own foreign policy. In this context, Poland is featured as a partner, though not the only one in the Eastern bloc, in international (the concept of défense – detente, as will be discussed later).8

Belgian researchers have also looked into the issue of Brussels’ participation in the structures of Europe and NATO, which, of course, is important from the vantage point of East–West relations, and the role of Belgium and Poland therein.9

Rik Coolsaet, together with Vincent Dujardin and Claude Roosens, are the authors of an important study regarding the Belgian Foreign Ministry. They have shown that with the apogee of the Cold War (as from the beginning of the 1950s), the opportunities for fruitful cooperation in foreign trade between East and West came to an end. In later years, this trend changed, and it was economic policy and ministries dealing with economics that were to play a key part in Belgian foreign policy (which signified a weakening of the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). An ever-increasing role in the development of foreign trade was played by multilateral trade-oriented organisations (GATT, Benelux and OECD). This had a significant influence on bilateral East–West trading contacts, including those with Poland.10

Herman Van der Wee is also convinced of their limited significance. His textbook of 199711 touches on the subject of economic cooperation with Eastern Bloc countries. Van der Wee maintains that in the years 1944–1965, economic contacts with Eastern bloc countries were restricted, politically driven and of little significance to the Belgian economy. Trade with the USSR and its satellites was marginal in comparison with the West, so it did not represent an important element in the economic policies of Belgium and Poland, which means that its peaks and troughs were of no real economic significance in the years 1945–1980.

There are also voices critical of the traditional approach to East–West relations, in treating them in diplomatic and inter-state categories. Non-state actors and mass social movements have also become the object of interest.12

In the light of this brief review of the academic literature, it is difficult not to recognise some measure of insufficiency in the historiography of Polish–Belgian relations. Its main fault lies in the insufficient utilisation of archival sources. The most important diplomatic documents were found in the Foreign Ministry Archive (AMSZ) in Warsaw, notably: telegrams, notes of conversations, materials documenting various aspects of contacts between Warsaw and Brussels as overseen by the Polish headquarters in Warsaw.

For the analysis of economic relations, regarding trade in particular, the numerous files kept in the New Records Archive (AAN) in Warsaw proved of immense value. They were primarily documents that originated from: the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MPiH), the Ministry of Finance (MF), the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MHZ), the Treasury (MS) and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy (MHZiGM).

A good deal of significant information on educationist and cultural contacts was unearthed in the AMSZ, as in those of the Foreign Cultural Cooperation Committee (KWKZ), the Ministry of Higher Education (MSzW) and the Ministry of Health and Social Security (MZiOS) archives. These sources were supplemented by the records of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (KC PZPR) and the Council of State Office (KRP). The military and security service records kept by the Central Military Archive (CAW) and the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) dealing with Belgian spies residing in Poland proved of relatively small use.

Archival research in Belgium brought far poorer results, though relatively broad access to the “Polish series” in the Belgian Foreign Affairs Archives (Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères Belges) was gained. Surprisingly perhaps, numerous Belgian documents were discovered in Polish archival collections.

Our archival enquiry into Belgian communist party records did not bring any significant findings; this could stem from the paucity of records on Polish affairs, which were found there. We are well aware of this lacuna and, at least at this stage of research, we are unable to fill it. This disproportion in Polish and Belgian source materials induces us to profile our research accordingly. First and foremost, in consonance with its title, this work concentrates on bilateral relations of a state character and, more precisely, on select aspects of Polish–Belgian international relations. As mentioned earlier, we were primarily interested in political contacts, economic cooperation (and financial issues in particular), the cultural–academic domain and social insurance problems. From this angle, we analysed not only the materials produced by the politicians and diplomats of both countries but also those produced by high-ranking state officials conducting economic negotiations or involved in academic and cultural exchange. Moreover, we decided to concentrate on an analysis of archival materials that are little known or altogether out of the loop of consideration, particularly Polish ones (though not only), which are relatively quite plentiful, and give insight into not just official documents. Thanks to them, it was possible to identify the aims and effects of various policies of Warsaw towards Belgium and, to a lesser degree, vice versa. It is precisely those materials that constitute the basis of our findings. The fact that we concentrate on select aspects of bilateral relations means, among others, that we are not concerned with a systematic analysis of the Polish immigrant community in Belgium in this period. Those questions are of interest to us insofar as they constituted significant problems in Polish–Belgian relations at the state level. Moreover, it is worth stressing that the life of the Polish immigrant community has been the subject of numerous studies; indeed, it may be asserted that they were the most frequently analysed problems in numerous monographs (above all, of I. Goddeeris, the most distinguished authority on this subject). We did not succeed in tracing sources of sufficient significance to add new findings in such relations to already published works on the subject.

Academic and cultural relations have been treated in a fairly limited way. Primarily, this stemmed from the lack of suitable materials in archival collections, and secondly, since cooperation in this field ever more frequently (as from the mid-1950s) was the subject of not only inter-state agreements but also at the local level, which requires fresh inquiries – equally into collections lying outside the central state offices. Academic–cultural relations have been treated in a fairly restricted way. This stemmed firstly from the lack of suitable materials in archival collections, and secondly, since cooperation in this field, ever more frequently (as from the mid-1950s), was the subject of not just inter-state agreements but also at the local level, and this requires fresh inquiries also into sources lying outside the central state offices.13 Is a study based on such sources a monograph on Polish–Belgian relations, or more, a study having the aim of introducing new findings on the topic of these relations as based on more exhaustive inquiries into the archives of both countries? It seems that the latter, more modest specification of research aims is more appropriate and academically justified. So, let us re-emphasise that the aim is to come to grips for the most part with new (mainly Polish, as well as Belgian, albeit to a lesser degree) source documents, and less so to fully utilise existing academic studies. The latter have the function of supplementing facts stemming from an analysis of these records, formulating a basic source-based critique and adumbrating the broader context of the analysed events and processes. Many of our research results were already published earlier in academic articles,14 but wherever possible, they were supplemented by fresh source inquiries for this publication.

While these reflections are divided into three parts dealing with political, economic and cultural/educational cooperation,15 departures from this general schema come in the first chapter with reflections on the Polish community in Belgium as a problem in political relations, in the third and sixth chapters on Polish education, and in Chapter 9, on social insurance. This was due to the need to highlight issues of particular importance in inter-state relations, which eluded the rigours of this study’s structure. The division itself into three parts stemmed from the ascertainment that, although the dynamic of Warsaw–Brussels contacts in the main paralleled the overarching fluctuating East–West relations as a whole, sequences of events exclusively specific to the bilateral relations of given countries lying either side of the iron curtain did at times occur,16 as was the case with relations between Warsaw and Brussels.

In Part I (1945–1952/1953), the inaugural point came when Brussels established diplomatic relations with Warsaw on 2 October 1945. These relations, after a period of relatively positive development, gradually slid into Cold War confrontation, which lasted until the turn of 1952/1953. Its ending was symbolically heralded by the death of Stalin in March 1953. This set in motion a destabilising thaw in international relations, in Polish–Belgian relations included.

The next stage covered the years 1953–1962/1963, characterised by progressive normalisation in various fields. This period of peace and productive cooperation was interrupted in mid-1960 by the engagement of Soviet satellite Eastern Bloc countries in the Belgian–Congolese conflict. The Polish People’s Republic (PRL), like other countries lying in the Soviet sphere of influence, actively supported the nationalist Patrice Lumumba, and after his death, his communist followers, supplying them with smuggled weapons. This led not only to the intensification of the civil war in the Congo but also to ructions in the international arena. Its spin-off effect was an impasse in Polish–Belgian political, economic and cultural relations.

Part III opens in 1963 when there was a decided improvement in mutual contacts culminating in the signing of a number of agreements, viz., indemnificatory and cultural with Belgium, and a new three-year trade agreement with Benelux, of which the Kingdom of Belgium is a constituent part. The symbolic inauguration of this new phase of cooperation was the visit to Warsaw of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak in December 1963. The close of the 1970s marks the end of this chapter. One could speak of the blossoming of Polish–Belgian relations in this period, which in principle were not particularly ruffled by the momentous and dramatic conflagrations in Poland, of March 1968, December 1970 or June 1976.

Due to the lack of an accessible, adequate source base for the 1980s, we took 1980 as the closing point for our study. The 1980s constitute a separate chapter in Poland’s post-war history, inaugurated with the birth and development of Solidarity, and crowned with a fundamental regime change in 1989. Moreover, already at the tail end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, there was a cooling of the international atmosphere (the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, the mass deployment of SS-20 rockets on the Soviet territory in 1977–1979, but in places putting the whole of Western Europe and the Far East within reach, and Pershing II missiles in West Germany by the NATO in 1979. Ultimately, in such conditions, not only was Polish–Belgian political cooperation considerably more difficult and of little effect, but trade relations as well, due to Polish debts towards Western creditors, Belgian ones included.

In Belgian contemporary history, the caesura of 1980 may at least partly be served by the adoption of constitutional reforms (also known as the second reform of the state). Henceforth, communities and regions acquired the right to conduct their own foreign policies within the areas of their competence. This signified the possibility of entering into agreements concerning education, culture, health, economics, environment and infrastructure. It seems that there is a need for deeper analyses of Polish–Belgian relations, not only at the federal level but also at the regional and community levels, which is a separate research issue requiring additional archival inquiries.

We conclude this monograph by recapitulating the most important facts in relations between Brussels and Warsaw. But before we begin our reflections proper, we believe it may be useful to adumbrate the historical context by reaching back to the most important facts in Polish–Belgian relations in the inter-war and World War II periods.

2. The Historical Context: Polish–Belgian Relations 1918–1945

Our reflections must start with the observation that the Treaty of Versailles determined the new power structure in Europe in which the leading role was to fall to Belgium’s allies, France and Great Britain (who were at once guarantors of her independence). It was not without significance for Belgium’s future that in the first two weeks of the Great War, the Belgian army took the brunt of the German onslaught in the West and held it up sufficiently for the Entente to mobilise and prepare its defences.17 Despite their defeat and German occupation, the heroic stance of the Belgians and of King Albert I himself won the admiration and sympathy of world opinion and of Allied political elites. Due to the engagement of Belgian armed forces under the command of Albert I and Gen. Cyriaque Gillain (also at the close of the war in autumn 1918), the activity of the émigré government of Charles de Broqueville in Le Havre, and of the Commission for Relief bringing material aid to Belgian society, Belgium won a significant position of influence for herself in the Allied camp.

For these reasons, the victorious powers endowed Belgium with the status of “a power with limited interests”.18 Further to the resolutions of the Paris conference, Belgium retrieved the cantons of Eupen and Malmédy, which, having initially been annexed by Prussia in 1815, were allocated to Belgium after World War I, along with the territories of Moresnet and Saint Vith, and a mandate over the German colony of Ruanda – Urundi (now Rwanda-Burundi). The release of Belgium from her treaty obligations of 1831 and 1839 concerning neutrality and forgiveness of war debts by the allies was also of significance. Moreover, Belgium’s right to reparations from Germany, the return of industrial installations, coal, raw materials and livestock sequestrated during the war, as well as works of art stolen by the Central Powers, was also recognised.19

The annexationist ambitions of Belgian politicians (extending to Zeelandic Flanders, Dutch Limburg, Luxembourg, and a share in the management of former German colonies) failed to win approval of the victorious great powers. Belgium rejected Great Britain’s offer of a guarantee of her independence on condition of a return to her pre-war neutral status.

The feeling of isolation and general sense of threat from Germany on the part of Belgian society, underpinned her talks with France, leading to their defensive alliance of 29 July 1920, against unprovoked German aggression. Moreover, the treaty assumed the joint occupation of the Rhineland and the close cooperation of both general staffs in the future. Closer relations with Paris extended to cooperation in foreign policy, above all, in the unconditional enforcement of the sanctions imposed on Germany at the Paris Peace Conference. Although this alliance tellingly affected Belgian diplomacy in the international arena, attitudes to the reborn Polish state and the Polish–Bolshevik war of 1919–1921 were tinged by the lost pre-World War I capital investments in various branches of the Russian economy (notably in railways, the power sector and mines). Their value stood at 341,603,500 roubles in gold (out of an overall total in western capital of 2,242,974,600 roubles in gold, i.e. 500 million francs in gold).20 Hence, despite the hostile attitude of Belgians to revolutionary Russia, Belgian governments were somewhat equivocal in regard to the struggles of the Polish state with its eastern neighbour on account of hopes of redeeming their capital investments.21

In tandem with hopes of settling relations with Russia, which was scoring successes in its struggle with Western intervention, came the participation of socialists in the Belgian coalition government, who sympathised with the Bolsheviks. Despite French pressure, they were loath to support Poland, and, in April 1920, on the strength of a treaty with the Bolsheviks, the Belgian government undertook “(not to) interfere in the internal affairs of … (or) cooperate in any way with aggression against Soviet Russia”.22

The establishment of official diplomatic relations between Belgium and Poland on 28 July 191923 had no ameliorative bearing on the negative attitude of the Catholic–liberal–socialist government of Prime Minister Léon Delacroix in regard to materially helping Poland in her war with Russia. This can be seen in the rejection of the Polish démarche of 27 July 1920, requesting the assignment to Poland of weapons and ammunition sequestrated by the Belgians from the Germans and permission for the transit of arms from France to Antwerp for shipment to Gdańsk.24 It was only the French pressure and persuasion that “Poland is dealing with an aggressor, which justifies bringing aid”, that made Delacroix “turn a blind eye to the transit of several trains to Antwerp”; this decision was rescinded, however (not without the behind-the-scenes machinations of socialists in the government, and demands of railway and docker trade unionists), and trains with arms for Poland were turned back. Under pressure from Paris, the cabinet then relented and allowed this cargo to go through on the basis of fait accompli. The urgent insistence of French politicians and military authorities (in this of gen. Maxime Weygand) on the question of aid for Poland did not ameliorate the generally negative attitude of the Belgian government (of 23 August 1920) to arms supplies, which led to the dismissal of the liberal Foreign Minister Paul Hymans,25 who was well-disposed towards Warsaw.

A far more sympathetic attitude to Poland’s struggles with the Bolsheviks, as emphasised by Michel Dumoulin, Józef Łaptos and Władysław Werstiuk, was taken by Belgian circles associated with the Catholic Church and the royal court. This can be seen in the commitment to bringing relief to Polish refugees from Russia, which came under the authority, in Catholic circles, of Cardinal Désiré – Joseph Mercier and the humanitarian aid for Polish frontline soldiers, organised by Albert I and his wife Elisabeth of Bavaria.26

Hope of recovering the capital sunk in tsarist Russia, and the repeated attempts at gaining compensation on this score, tempered Belgian diplomacy’s enthusiasm for the renascent Polish state.

How did Belgian government circles perceive inter-war Poland and its foreign policy? The answer to this lies in the reports of Belgian diplomats accredited to Warsaw. Successive envoys: Bernard de l’Escaille (1921–1933),27 Jacques Davignon (1933–1936)28 and Alexandre Paternotte de la Vaillée (1936–1939)29 watched the Polish political scene and the shortcomings of its parliamentary system with concern. They laid stress on the bitter internecine feuds, and the pre-eminent role of Marshal Piłsudski in the political life of the country, whom, in the years 1921–1926, de l’Escaille cast as a grey eminence. He described the Marshal’s withdrawal from public life in this period as “more apparent than real”. In his assessment, successive governments were too weak to resist a man who “continued to interfere in everything that concerned the army”.30

In describing the Polish political scene, de l’Escaille reported on “the inordinate popularity of Piłsudski both in the army and in left-wing (socialist) circles”. He added that, in the years 1921–1926, successive governments were “too weak to oppose the strong will of the Marshal”. According to this envoy, Piłsudski’s intrigues and conflicts with generals of Endek (National Democrat) persuasion (Stanisław Haller and Stefan Majewski) had “a devastating effect on the fighting strength of the Polish armed forces”. Piłsudski himself, whom, in reference to his past, the envoy called a mercenary, was supposedly bereft of military knowledge essential to conducting modern warfare and an ignoramus in the field of foreign policy.31 Piłsudski’s cabinets, de l’Escaille asserted, “constituted a danger to Polish security, especially in a period when the country wrestled with ‘an extremely difficult economic and financial situation’”.32 He observed Polish foreign policy in the period of government by colonels with alarm and aversion. Following the ructions along the Paris–Warsaw axis, he wrote (not without the influence of the French ambassador to Warsaw, Jules Laroche) that “the illusions which Polish diplomacy nurtures with regard its true standing, trying to free itself from French tutelage, lead to the country’s isolation on the international scene”. He described its totality as vacuous posturing and whimsy, which “should not be treated too seriously”.33

With time, this envoy took a somewhat broader view of the determinants of Polish foreign policy. However, time and again, he stressed the necessity of close Polish–French cooperation, defining it as a “community of interests” which was to stem both from Poland’s geographical position and from the European situation (i.e. the real danger to both countries from Germany, which the government in Warsaw was to appreciate less and less).34 On the other hand, he spared no criticism in the assessment of the domestic policy of the Sanacja regime, as it was called. This criticism, which chimed in with the policy towards Poland of the successive Catholic–liberal Belgian governments of 1928–1931, intensified after the imprisonment of the leaders of Centrolew (the Polish centre-left coalition) in the fortress of Brest-Litovsk.35

As tensions in Europe rose upon Adolf Hitler’s accession to power, de l’Escaille’s successor, Jacques Davignon, reports from Warsaw, seem a lot more balanced. Probably, this ought to be associated with Belgium’s drift towards neutrality stimulated by growing distrust of France in Belgian military and government (Catholic–liberal) circles in 1932–1936, and Davignon’s personal relations with Polish government circles.36

In his political correspondence, Davignon not only parroted, like his predecessor, the opinions of French (Jules Laroche) and British (Howard W. Kennard) diplomats, but also drew on his close ties of friendship with Minister Józef Beck’s chef de cabinet, Kazimierz Roman Dębicki, who spent the years 1919–1927 in Brussels, retaining from that time, as Davignon described it, des sentiments de vif intérêt et de sympathie envers notre pays. In his reports, he openly admitted that Dębicki was for him “an invaluable source of information”, indeed, he called him his best informer. He frequently referred to his personal relations with the influential deputy Foreign Minister Jan Szembek (Poland’s ambassador to Belgium in 1924–1927).37 He, too, deplored the “political games” characterising Marshal Piłsudski’s foreign policy (in this the idea of a preventive war),38 weakening the prestige of France and trust in her policy in the eyes of the Polish political elites, engaging in talks with Hitler’s Germany,39 and then signing the Polish–German declaration of non-aggression of 26 January 1934. According to Davignon, that step, together with its preceding Polish–German negotiations, came as “a shock in Paris and dismay and speculation in the political and diplomatic circles of Europe”, but he also saw it as a symptom of Warsaw’s greater independence in foreign policy, primarily in relation to France.40

With the passage of time, Davignon increasingly distanced himself from the views of Polish governing circles and, not without irony, he wrote about Poland “rising [from her knees]” (la politique de redressement) and her excessive ambitions to play “an important role on the international chessboard”.41 Friendship with representatives of Polish political elites never excluded his critical evaluation of the overall drift of Polish foreign policy from its “brutal turn” with the declaration of non-aggression of 26 January 1934, as Davignon saw it. He interpreted this step as “the flattery of the amour propre” of Polish governing circles and “an attempt to advance to great power status without accepting either responsibility or risk [for its activities]”. That was to have stemmed from an addiction to political adventurism of Polish opinion-shapers, which “in reality, in the long term, could not remove the German threat, and could only complicate relations with Paris and facilitate Hitler’s policy”.42

Anatol Mühlstein, a Polish embassy adviser in Paris who had widespread contacts in Belgium, also spoke of the mounting distaste for Polish foreign policy as expressed by Belgian political elites and public opinion in autumn 1934.43 The accuracy of this observation seemed to confirm the remark expressed a year later by envoy Tadeusz Jackowski, on the reluctance of Paul van Zeeland’s government to establish “permanent close political cooperation” with Poland.44 In this context, exaggerated wishful thinking seems to have guided Beck in his assertion of “establishing close and cordial relations with the Belgian” Prime Minister (Paul van Zeeland – in conversation during a break at a League of Nations Council meeting in Geneva – MP) and agreeing “the principles of permanent close political cooperation”.45

The true effects of that conversation seem weak both in terms of political and economic cooperation. Neither the signing of the Polish–Belgian trade treaty (4 March 1936) nor, in effect, the unproductive visit of Beck in Brussels (21–22 May 1937), or that of Minister van Zeeland in Warsaw in the same year, changed this.46 In Belgian governing circles, the conviction took hold (as reported earlier by Jackowski), “that the absorptiveness of the Polish market is diminishing to the extent that the acquisition of greater import quotas for Belgian goods would represent advantages of a fairly problematic nature”. Moreover, the Belgian capital, be it industrial-investment or banking-credit, “evinced since a certain time … a tendency not to engage in Poland and even in some cases … to pull out of the Polish market”.47

Details

Pages
XII, 380
Publication Year
2026
ISBN (ePUB)
9783631947319
ISBN (PDF)
9783631950609
ISBN (Hardcover)
9783631947302
DOI
10.3726/b23650
Language
English
Publication date
2026 (November)
Keywords
Cold War International Politics Polish-Belgian Relations Cultural cooperation Geopolitics Economic cooperation European history
Published
Berlin, Bruxelles, Chennai, Lausanne, New York, Oxford, 2026. xii, 380 pp., 14 tables.
Product Safety
Peter Lang Group AG

Biographical notes

Dariusz Jarosz (Author) Maria Pasztor (Author)

Maria Pasztor is a professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. She specializes in Polish relations with Western countries (mainly France and Italy). Author of, among others, the work Polish–French Relations, 1944–1989, Peter Lang Edition, Frankfurt am Main 2015 (with Dariusz Jarosz). Dariusz Jarosz is a professor of history at the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Science in Warsaw. He specializes mainly in the social history of Poland after 1945. Author of, among others, the work: Increase Supply, Reduce Demand and Punish Severely. A Contextual History of Meat in Communist Poland, Peter Lang Edition, Berlin 2020 (with Maria Pasztor).

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Title: In the Shadows of Cold War Politics